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Abstract: Using Korean data, we investigate information asymmetry among investors before analysts
change their stock recommendations. By comparing trading activities between individuals, institutions,
and foreign investors, we find that there is information asymmetry before analysts change their recom-
mendations. Institutional investors buy/sell the stock before recommendation upgrades/downgrades,
but individuals and foreign investors do not anticipate the upcoming news. We also document that the
trade imbalance of institutional investors are associated with stock returns upon the announcements of
recommendation changes. This result indicates that institutions take advantage of  their superior informa-
tion around the recommendation changes.
Abstrak: Dengan menggunakan data di pusat saham Korea, kami menyelidiki asimetri informasi diantara
para investor sebelum analis mengubah rekomendasi saham mereka. Dengan membandingkan aktivitas
perdagangan yang dilakukan oleh masing-masing individu, lembaga, dan para investor asing, kami
menemukan bahwa ada asimetri informasi sebelum analis mengubah rekomendasi mereka. Hal ini terbukti
karena para investor dari institusi secara cepat-cepat membeli / menjual saham mereka sebelum adanya
rekomendasi kenaikan/ penurunan peringkat, namun sayang sekali hal ini tidak dilakukan oleh investor
individu dan investor asing karena mereka tidak mengantisipasi berita yang akan datang. Kami juga
menemukan bahwa ketidakseimbangan perdagangan investor institusi terkait dengan pengembalian saham
setelah pengumuman perubahan rekomendasi. Penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa investor institusi dengan
sengaja mengambil keuntungan dari informasi yang mereka peroleh tentang perubahan rekomendasi.
Keywords: information asymmetry; institutional investor; stock recommendation; trade
imbalance
 JEL classification: G10; G30
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Introduction
Investors usually utilize earnings fore-
casts, price forecasts, and stock recommen-
dations of sell-side analysts to make their
investment decisions. The investors expect
that analysts provide objective, unbiased, and
accurate equity research reports to the best
of their knowledge. However, the literature
has accumulated evidence that sell-side ana-
lysts’ forecasts are tainted and not objective.1
Sell-side analysts working for an investment
bank are under pressure to provide optimis-
tic recommendations on firms that can pro-
vide business to the investment bank. Ana-
lysts working in brokerage houses are also
under pressure to provide optimistic recom-
mendations to attract trading revenues be-
cause upgrades attract more business than
downgrades due to the restrictions on short
selling.2 To be consistent with these conflicts
of interest, previous literature finds that ana-
lysts affiliated with investment banks and
brokers produce more optimistic earnings,
and are more likely to give buy recommenda-
tions [for instance, Dugar and Nathan(1995);
Michaely and Womack (1999); Cowen et al.
(2006); Agrawal and Chen (2008)].
Recently, Irvine et al. (2007) test the
“tipping hypothesis” using the data of initial
recommendations, and document that broker-
age firms provide the contents of  affiliated
analyst reports to important clients who gen-
erate large trading commissions before the
information becomes public. Although tip-
ping only benefits some investors, it is not
prohibited by regulations in most countries.
If some investors have access to the contents
of upcoming analysts’ reports in advance,
then they could exploit their superior infor-
mation obtained from the reports. In this re-
search, we try to investigate whether infor-
mation asymmetry gets larger among inves-
tors before sell-side analysts change their rec-
ommendations.
We use Korean data since the Korea
Exchange provides daily trading volume by
investor types for all stocks traded on the
Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the Ko-
rea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(KOSDAQ). We divide investors into three
groups, individuals, institutions, and foreign-
ers. Unlike individual investors, institutions
frequently communicate with brokerage
firms, investment banks, and asset manage-
ment firms to acquire information, which
makes it possible for them to have access to
analysts’ reports in advance. Also, institutions
can interpret and process information more
precisely, compared to individuals. Therefore,
we conjecture that institutional investors are
better informed than individuals on upcom-
ing recommendation changes made by sell-
side analysts. We also investigate whether
foreigners have an informational advantage
compared to domestic investors on the rec-
ommendation changes. Previous literature
provides inconclusive evidence that foreign-
ers perform better than domestic investors
in trading stocks. For instance, Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000) find that foreign investors
act like momentum investors, with high lev-
els of sophistication, and that they outper-
form local individual investors in the Finn-
ish stock market. In contrast, Choe et al.
(2005) find no evidence that foreign inves-
tors are better performed than domestic in-
stitutions in the Korean market. Using the
1 Mehran and Stulz (2007) provide an excellent summary of the literature.
2 In the US the Security and Exchange Commission makes these conflicts of interests available to investors at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm.
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Korean data, we compare the activities of
informed trading by foreign versus domestic
investors around a specific event, an analyst’s
recommendation change.
To test who has informational advan-
tage among individuals, domestic institutions,
and foreign investors, we investigate the buy-
ing and selling volume by each investor group
around analysts’ recommendation changes.
For the test, we estimate the standardized
trade imbalance (STI, our proxy for buying
or selling volume) by each investor group
before recommendation changes. The posi-
tive (negative) STI indicates the net buying/
selling volume by investors. To test the in-
formation asymmetry among the investor
groups, we examine whether there is a differ-
ence in the STIs by investor groups prior to
analysts’ recommendation changes and
whether the STIs are associated with stock
returns upon the announcements of the rec-
ommendation changes.
Our sample consists of 1,281 analysts’
recommendation upgrades and 1,584 down-
grades over the period of 2001-2008. First,
we find that there is no significant difference
in firm characteristics between the upgrade
and downgrade samples. We then examine
abnormal returns around the recommenda-
tion changes. We find that stock prices start
increasing even before the announcements of
upgrades, while stock prices begin decreas-
ing after the announcements of  downgrades.
The mean CAR (cumulative abnormal return)
over the window of days -5 to -1 before up-
grades is 1.21 percent while that before down-
grades is 0.29 percent. The result indicates
that capital markets anticipate the positive
news, but do not anticipate the negative
news. The mean CAR over the window of
days 0 to 5 after upgrades is 1.77 percent
while that after downgrades is -1.25 percent.
The abnormal returns after recommendation
changes are significantly different from zero.
Next, we examine the difference in the
STIs by individuals, domestic institutions,
and foreigners to test information asymme-
try among the investor types. Over the pe-
riod of days -5 to -1, the STIs by domestic
institutions are 0.36 before upgrades and -
0.28 before downgrades, and the STIs are sta-
tistically different from zero. The STIs by in-
dividuals and foreigners before recommenda-
tion changes are not statistically different
from zero. The result indicates that domestic
institutions buy the stock before the recom-
mendation upgrades and sell before the down-
grades. However, individual and foreign in-
vestors do not trade anticipating the recom-
mendation changes. Further, we test whether
the STIs for each investor type before rec-
ommendation changes are associated with
abnormal returns upon the announcements
of the changes in multivariate regressions
after controlling for other determinants. We
find that the STI for institutions is positively
associated with the CAR and STIs for indi-
viduals and foreigners are not associated with
the CARs. The result corroborates that do-
mestic institutions trade stocks anticipating
analysts’ recommendation upgrades or down-
grades.
Our paper adds to extant literature by
examining the short-term informational ad-
vantage of institutions over other investors
around analysts’ recommendation changes
using high-frequency data in Korea. Our evi-
dence shows that domestic institutions take
advantage of  their superior information
around recommendation changes, which is
indirectly consistent with Irvine et al.’s (2007)
finding. We also contribute to the growing lit-
erature on foreign investors’ trading in the
emerging markets. We find that foreign insti-
Park et al.
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tutions’ trading is not distinctive around rec-
ommendation changes and does not predict
stock returns. This shows that foreign insti-
tutions have an informational disadvantage
compared to local institutions around the
specific event. The result is broadly consis-
tent with Brennan and Cao’s (1997) argument
that foreign investors experience an informa-
tional disadvantage in the local markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II reviews the related litera-
ture. Section III describes the data and Sec-
tion IV explains the empirical findings. Sec-
tion V concludes the paper.
Literature Review
The Information Contents of
Analyst Recommendations
An analyst’s report, which contains his
(or her) view on whether to buy or sell par-
ticular stocks for clients, usually include earn-
ings forecasts, target prices, long-term growth
forecasts, and (or) stock recommendations.
In general, analysts’ stock recommendations
fall into one of  five categories: strong buy,
buy, hold, sell, and strong sell. Analysts re-
vise their recommendations by upgrading or
downgrading them when needed. The recom-
mendation changes are commonly regarded
as useful information in the market and lead
to movements in stock prices.
Where a recommendation about a par-
ticular stock is disseminated through various
publications and other media outlets, it has
an immediate impact on the stock price and
trading volume. Many researchers in finance
and accounting have investigated whether the
“informativeness” of  analyst recommenda-
tions actually exists. Prior literature shows
that analyst recommendations are generally
informative. For example, Stickel (1995) and
Womack (1996) find a positive stock price
reaction to recommendation upgrades and a
negative price reaction to downgrades. These
studies suggest larger market reactions to rec-
ommendation downgrades. Womack (1996),
in particular, shows that changes in analysts’
recommendations have a meaningful stock-
price impact, and this impact exists not only
on the date which an analyst revises his or
her recommendation but lasts up to several
months after the change. Analysts tend to
acquire public and private information, pro-
cess the information, and then incorporate
their views into their recommendations.
Francis and Soffer (1997) suggest that earn-
ings forecast revisions are accompanied by
changes in stock recommendations, and in-
vestors impose large weights on the revisions
accompanied by buy, hold, or sell recommen-
dations. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) argue
that recommendation upgrades and earnings
forecast revisions right before the announce-
ment of an earnings report have more infor-
mation than those released right after the
earnings announcement. Jegadeesh et al.
(2004) find that analyst recommendations
have a predictive ability in the American
stock market and that recommendation
changes have a larger predictive ability than
recommendation levels. Asquith et al. (2005)
examine the reaction of the stock market to
all the elements of analysts’ reports, such as
recommendations, earnings forecasts, target
prices, and the revisions of these things, and
find that other elements of analysts’ reports
influence recommendation changes and have
significant and positive effects on the return
variation around the release of  the reports.
Furthermore, investors perceive reports
written by analysts, who are important infor-
mation providers in the market, as being es-
sential to avoid losses as much as possible,
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stemming from their own lack of  informa-
tion about companies and information asym-
metry. That is, institutional and individual
investors use analysts’ reports to make their
investment decisions since stock recommen-
dations and recommendation changes are
important sources of  information for them.
According to Brown et al. (2009), mutual
funds actively use information about recom-
mendation changes when making decisions
on portfolio investments. Boni and Womack
(2006) argue that analysts’ recommendation
changes often lead to profitable trading strat-
egies within industries rather than across the
industries. Chen and Cheng (2006) find that
institutional investors profit from transactions
relying on such recommendations. Mikhail et
al. (2007) argue that larger investors’ trans-
actions are similar to small investors’ in rela-
tion to recommendation changes, but stock
trading by larger investors depends on the
amount of  information about recommenda-
tion changes while transactions by small in-
vestors tend to be concentrated around the
time of  recommendation changes. In particu-
lar, Green (2006) finds that the clients of
brokerage firms can make profitable transac-
tions if  they have information about analysts’
recommendation changes in advance.
Incentives to Pre-Release Analyst
Reports to Selective Investors
Recently, it has been claimed that bro-
kerage firms have incentives to provide the
contents of affiliated analysts’ reports with
important clients in advance who generate
large trading commissions for the firms. This
is the so called “tipping hypothesis” (Irvine
et al. (2007)). Although tipping only benefits
some investors, it is not prohibited by regu-
lations in most countries as the Association
for Investment Management and Research
(AIMR) guidelines proscribe it.3 Some partici-
pants of financial markets recognize tipping
as a common practice, which is described by
brokerage firms as a reward for particular cli-
ents (i.e. institutional investors). Thus, policy
makers in major countries tend to emphasize
the need for stricter regulation about tipping,
which is an unfair trading practice that goes
against the interests of  most investors.
A research department of a brokerage
firm tends to recover some portion of  the
costs of research from commission revenues
on the trading activity of institutional inves-
tors who benefit from the research. Yet, if
the tipping practice is limited, brokerage firms
would lose their commission revenues be-
cause institutional investors reduce the value
of  research. Then, brokerage firms cannot
recover the cost of  their research. For this
reason, some research about tipping argues
that brokerage firms have economic incen-
tives to provide in advance the recommen-
dation or recommendation changes of ana-
lysts’ reports to selective investors [Irvine et
al.(2007); Christophe et al. (2010)].
Irvine et al. (2007) examine the prac-
tices of  brokerage firms which provide se-
lective institutional investors with their af-
filiated analysts’ initial buy recommendations
before the public release. They document
evidence on the existence, extent, and char-
acteristics of tipping using a proprietary da-
tabase of institutional trading activity around
the release date of  analysts’ initial reports.4
3 Refer to Irvine et al. (2007): 742.
4 Irvine et al. 2007 used limited data from the consulting firm Plexus Group, which monitors the costs of
institutional trading.
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According to their research results, institu-
tional trading volume is abnormally high four
days before the release of analysts’ initial buy
recommendations which contain their posi-
tive recommendations. Institutional buying is
distinctive even after controlling for past re-
turns. They argue that the results are not
driven by momentum trading as reported by
Griffin et al. (2003), but by tipping-induced
trading. Christophe et al. (2010) also find that
the institutional activities of short selling are
higher in the three days before analysts pub-
licly announce their recommendation down-
grades. They argue that the results are more
consistent with the tipping hypothesis than
the prediction hypothesis which posits that
short sellers successfully predict downgrades
on the basis of  public information about the
firms’ financial position. These studies sug-
gest that institutional investors and short sell-
ers receive tips prior to the release of  reports.
However, Blau and Wade (2012) test the tip-
ping hypothesis using short selling data
around both recommendation downgrades
and upgrades, and find higher short selling
prior to upgrades as well as downgrades. They
contend that short selling prior to both down-
grades and upgrades is likely to be more
speculative in nature rather than informed.
Meanwhile, Green (2006) presumes that
institutional investors pay significant amounts
to obtain real-time access to the research of
brokerage firms through information provid-
ers such as First Call, and then examines the
short-term informational advantage of  bro-
kerage firms on analysts’ recommendation
changes. Green (2006) documents that mar-
ket participants with early access to recom-
mendation changes have profitable opportu-
nities of investment and then get average re-
turns of 1.02 percent (1.50%) for two days
following the pre-release of recommendation
upgrades/downgrades by purchasing (selling
short) quickly. Juergens and Lindsey (2009)
also conjecture that even though the research
departments of  large brokerage firms are
sources of  information, these units do not
generate income directly so they rely on fi-
nancial support from other business depart-
ments of  the firms. They examine the trad-
ing activities of Nasdaq market makers, who
have affiliated analysts, around recommen-
dation changes. They find that the trading
volume of the market makers associated with
recommendation changes by their affiliated
analysts displays a disproportionate increase,
and the selling volume increases in the two
days preceding a downgrade.
Data Description
To investigate the informed trading be-
fore recommendation changes, we first ob-
tain the data in analysts’ reports on South
Korean companies from a database,
FnConsensus of FnGuide.5 The South Korean
financial data provider, FnGuide, collects
data on analysts’ reports from 2000 onwards.
Due to this time limitation, our sample in-
cludes analysts’ recommendation data for the
companies listed on the Korea Stock Ex-
change over the fiscal years of 2001-2008.
We exclude financial companies following
previous literature. We then combine account-
ing, trading volume by investor types, and
stock return data with the analysts’ forecast
data. We obtain annual accounting data over
the sample period of  2001-2008 from Total
Solution 2000 (TS 2000), a database compiled
5 We also collect analysts’ forecast data from IBES. We find that the data from local data provider, FnGuide is
more comprehensive than that from IBES, so we use the data from FnGuide.
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by the Korean Listed Companies’ Association. We
obtain the daily trading volume of each stock
by domestic individuals, domestic institu-
tions, and foreigners around the announce-
ment dates of recommendation changes from
Korea Exchange. We also obtain stock return
data and Korean market index around the
dates of recommendation changes from a
database (KIS-value) of the Korean Information
Service (KIS). The KIS is affiliated with
Moody’s and is a leading provider of  credit-
related information and services in South
Korea. Our sample consists of all stocks that
satisfy the following criteria.
(a) There should be at least one analyst who
issues a recommendation for the stock and
changes the recommendation within 180
calendar days.
(b) At least two analysts, other than the re-
vising analyst, should have active recom-
mendations for the stock as of the day
before the change. We consider a recom-
mendation to be active for up to 180 days
after it is issued. We impose the 180-day
criterion to screen out stale recommen-
dations.
(c) The stock price should be at least 1,000
Won (about 1 USD) on the day before the
recommendation change date.
(d) The stock return data around the dates
of recommendation changes should be
available on KIS-value.
(e) The annual accounting data from Total
Solution 2000 (TS 2000), a database com-
piled by the Korean Listed Companies’ As-
sociation should be obtained.
(f) The daily trading volume of each stock
by domestic individuals, domestic insti-
tutions, and foreigners around earnings an-
nouncement dates from Korea Exchange
should be obtained.
(g) We exclude firms with a combined own-
ership of institutions and foreigners of
less than 5 percent since we are investi-
gating whether institutional investors have
better information.
We then classi fy recommendation
changes as herding and non-herding, move-
ment toward or away from the consensus fol-
lowing Jegadeesh and Kim (2010). The con-
sensus is the average of active recommenda-
tions just before the recommendation
changes. Analysts’ recommendations rate
stocks as “strong buy,” “buy,” “hold,” “sell,”
and “strong sell.” To calculate the consen-
sus, we convert the recommendations to nu-
merical scores where “5” is strong buy, “4” is
buy, and so on. Therefore, we map an up-
grade to a positive number and a downgrade
to a negative number. For most of  our analy-
ses, we use only the non-herding sample
which consists of 1,281 upgrades and 1,584
downgrades since the herding tends not to
bring new information to capital markets (re-
fer to Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)).
Panel A of  Table 1 present the number
of  upgrades and downgrades year by year.
Analysts tend to avoid issuing “sell” or
“strong sell” recommendations. Out of  1,281
upgrades, 1,201 recommendations (93.8%)
are changes to “buy” from “hold,” “sell,” or
“strong sell.” Out of 1,584 downgrades,
1,485 recommendations (93.7%) are changes
to “hold” from “buy” or “strong buy.” Most
of the recommendation changes happened in
the period of 2004-2006.
Panel B of  Table 1 presents descriptive
statistics of each variable to explain the char-
acteristics of  sample firm-years. The panel
presents the mean, 75 percentile, median, 25
percentile, and standard deviation of each
variable. The mean total assets is about
44,832 billion Won and the mean market capi-
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talization is about 32,974 billion won.6 The
mean EPS (earnings per share) is about 4,572
Won and the mean number of  analysts fol-
lowing is about 67. The mean profitability
(earnings before interest and taxes divided by
total assets) is about 9 percent and the mean
leverage (total debt divided by total assets)
is 46 percent. The mean dividend yield (cash
dividend paid per share divided by stock price)
is about 3.8 percent and the mean market to
book ratio of equity is about 1.54.
Empirical Findings
Since the different characteristics of
upgraded vs. downgraded firms can affect the
results of our empirical tests, we first do dif-
ference tests in firm characteristics between
the two sub-samples. In Table 2, we report
the results of the mean and median differ-
ence tests in firm characteristics with recom-
mendation upgrades vs. downgrades. Total
assets and market capitalization are not sta-
tistically different between the two sub-
samples. Also, EPS and the number of  ana-
lysts following are not statistically different
between the two sub-samples. The mean (me-
dian) profitability (EBIT divided by total as-
sets) is 8.70 percent (7.75%) for upgraded
firms while it is 9.10 percent (8.00%) for
downgraded firms. The mean difference is
marginally significant, but the median differ-
ence is not significant. The leverage, dividend
yield, and the market to book ratio of equity
are not statistically different between the two
sub-samples. These results suggest that the
characteristics of upgraded and downgraded
firms are not significantly different.
To verify whether analysts’ recommen-
dation changes bring new information to capi-
tal markets, we examine stock price changes
around the announcement dates of the rec-
ommendation changes. We measure the ab-
normal return (AR) and cumulative abnor-
mal return (CAR) around the announcements
of  analysts’ recommendation changes. AR
i,t
is a market-adjusted return for a firm i on day
t, calculated in the following way:
AR
i,t
= R
i,t
 - R
m,t
................................(1)
where R
i,t
 is a return for a firm i on day t and
R
m,t
 is a value-weighted return of all stocks
traded on Korean exchanges on day t. Then,
we calculate a CAR over the period from day
t1 to t2 in the following way.
Panel A of  Table 3 presents the mean
abnormal return (AR), t-statistics, and percent-
age of  positive abnormal returns on each
event date around the announcements of rec-
ommendation upgrades and downgrades. The
abnormal returns are significantly positive
over the days of  -4 to +4 around upgrades.
However, the abnormal returns do not show
consistent patterns before downgrades, which
suggests that capital markets do not antici-
pate negative news in general.
Panel B of  Table 3 presents the mean
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), t-statis-
tics, and percentage of positive CARs over
the several event periods around upgrades
and downgrades. The mean CAR over the
trading days from -5 to -1 before upgrades is
1.21 percent and significantly different from
zero at 1 percent confidence level, which sug-
gests that capital markets anticipate positive
CAR 
(t1 ,t2)
= ARt...........................(2)
t1
t= t1
6 Won is a unit of  Korean currency.
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news or analysts slowly adjust to the perfor-
mance of  firms. The mean CAR is 1.77 per-
cent over the days of 0 to 5 after the announce-
ments of upgrades, which indicates that the
stock prices continue to increase after the
positive event. However, stock prices decline
only after the announcements of recommen-
dation downgrades, which indicates that in-
vestors do not anticipate recommendation
downgrades in advance. Right after the an-
nouncement of recommendation downgrades,
investors react significantly negatively to the
recommendation downgrades issued by ana-
lysts. We find that the mean CAR (-1.25%)
over the period of days 0 to 5 is significant
with the p-value of less than 0.01. The re-
sults indicate that recommendation down-
grades issued by analysts are more surprising
to capital markets. In addition, the percent-
age of positive CARs is much higher on the
recommendation upgrades than downgrades.
The findings in Table 3 are consistent with
the previous evidence that analysts’ stock
recommendations have at least a short-term
investment value (see, e.g., Stickel (1995);
Womack (1996); Barber et al . (2001);
Jegadeesh et al. (2004); Green (2006)).
Our main interest is whether any type
of investors anticipate the announcements of
analysts’ recommendation changes and take
advantage of  their superior information. If
institutional investors have an informational
advantage on the upcoming recommendation
changes compared to individual and foreign
investors, they would buy stocks before up-
grades and sell stocks before downgrades. To
test the hypothesis, we use a standardized
trading imbalance (STI) to measure the di-
rection of the trading by each type of inves-
tors before the recommendation changes fol-
lowing Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)
and Lai and Teo (2008). We first calculate
the trade imbalance (TI) of  a firm i by x type
investor on day t as Equation 3.
We then normalize TI to get the stan-
dardized trade imbalance (STI) using the stan-
dard deviation of the TI over the year as
Equation 4.
If STI is positive (negative), a specific type
of investors buy/sell the stock.
Panel A of  Table 4 shows the mean
cumulative STI by individuals, institutions,
and foreigners around the announcements of
recommendation upgrades. To investigate
which investors have an informational advan-
tage over the short-term period, we measure
the STIs by each investor group around the
event periods of days from -5 to -1, from -3
to -1, from 0 to 1, from 0 to 3, or from 0 to 5.
Over the period from day -5 to day -1, the
mean STI by individuals is about -0.13, the
mean STI by institutions is about 0.36, and
that by foreigners is -0.10. The STIs by indi-
viduals and foreigners are not statistically dif-
ferent from zero, but the STI by institutions
is statistically different from zero at the con-
fidence level of 1 percent. The result indi-
cates that institutions tend to buy the stocks
before upgrades, whereas individuals and for-
eigners do not anticipate the good news. Over
the period from day 0 to day 1 (or from day 0
to day 3, or day 0 to day 5), the STI by indi-
viduals is negative and that by institutions is
positive. The result indicates that the insti-
tutions continue to buy the stocks even after
the announcements of recommendation up-
TI
i,x,t
=                                             ....... (3)
Buy Volume
i,x,t
 - Sell Volume
i,x,t
Buy Volume
i,x,t
 + Sell Volume
i,x,t
STI
i,x,t
=                       ...............(4)
TI
i,x,t
 - TI
i,x,year (t)
std (TI
i,x,year (t)
)
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grades. This also suggests that the directional
trading of stocks around recommendation
upgrades tend to be initiated by institutional
investors. However, the STIs by foreign in-
vestors are not different from zero around the
recommendation upgrades, which indicates
that the foreign investors do not trade differ-
ently around the events. The ANOVA test
also shows that each STI is different from
those by other investor types.
Panel B of  Table 4 presents the mean
cumulative STI by each investor type around
the announcements of recommendation
downgrades. The STI by institutions over the
period of days from -5 to -1 is about -0.28
with p-value of less than 0.01, which means
that domestic institutions sell the stocks an-
ticipating the recommendation downgrades.
However, the STIs by individuals and for-
eigners are not statistically different from
Table 4. Standardized Trade Imbalance (STI) around Analyst Recommendation Changes
Panel A: Recommendation Upgrades
Investor Type -5 to -1 -3 to -1 0 to 1 0 to 3 0 to 5
Individual Investor -0.13 -0.10 -0.16*** -0.40*** -0.62***
(-1.51) (-1.68) (-3.74) (-5.64) (-6.52)
Institution Investor 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.54*** 0.66***
(4.34) (4.81) (7.02) (7.61) (6.94)
Foreigner Investor0 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.04
(-1.14) (-1.87) (-0.96) (-0.22) (0.42)
Panel B: Recommendation Downgrades
Investor Type -5 to -1 -3 to -1 0 to 1 0 to 3 0 to 5
Individual Investor 0.06 0.08 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.38***
(0.83) (1.52) (4.21) (4.51) (4.44)
Institution Investor -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.34*** -0.46***
(-3.73) (-3.71) (-5.05) (-5.22) (-5.26)
Foreigner Investor 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.08
(1.00) (1.18) (0.68) (-0.25) (-0.95)
Panel A and B report cumulative standardized trade imbalance (STI) by three investor types, individuals,
institutions, and foreigners over different event periods for the firms released analyst recommendation
changes. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates on the upgrade and downgrade dummies when stan-
dardized trade imbalance is regressed on the upgrade and downgrade dummies. Day 0 is the analyst
recommendation change date. If STI is positive (negative), buying volume is larger (smaller) than selling
volume. ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively.
Park et al.
238
zero. The results also show that the domestic
institutions continue to sell the stocks after
the event, which indicates that the trading
around recommendation downgrades is initi-
ated by the domestic institutional investors.
The ANOVA test shows that each STI is sta-
tistically different from those by other inves-
tor types. The results in Table 4 suggest that
institutional investors trade stocks anticipat-
ing the direction of  recommendation changes.
To corroborate whether domestic insti-
tutions successfully exploit their informa-
tional advantage around recommendation
changes, we investigate whether their trad-
ing before the events predicts the abnormal
return upon the announcements of the events
in multivariate regressions. We mainly esti-
mate the Equation 5.
We try to find the relation between cu-
mulative abnormal return (CAR) over the
period of days from 0 to 5 and the STI for
each investor type over the period of days
from -5 to -1 in the regression. We include
the CARs over the period of days from -25
to -1 to control for stock return momentum
and over the period of days from -5 to -1 to
control for return reversal. We also include
firm size, market to book ratio of  equity
(MB), and the number of analysts covering
each firm-year (NumAnal) to control for in-
formation asymmetry. The firm size is calcu-
lated as a natural log of market capitaliza-
tion at the end of  the fiscal year.
Since our sample of  firms with recom-
mendation upgrades and downgrades is a
cross-sectional time-series (panel) data, we
estimate the equation using OLS with clus-
tered standard errors and report the results in
Table 5.7 The dependent variable is the CAR
over the days from 0 to 5 in all the models.
As main explanatory variables, we use the STI
for institutions over the days from -5 to -1 in
model 1 and the STIs for individuals and for-
eigners in models 2 and 3. Model 4 includes
the STIs for three investor types as explana-
tory variables. The coefficient on the STI for
institutions is 0.15 and statistically significant
with a p-value of less than 0.01 in model 1,
which indicates that the institutional inves-
tors’ buying or selling volume before upgrades
and downgrades is positively associated with
the stock returns after the announcements of
the recommendation changes. However, the
STI for individuals are not related to the ab-
normal returns in model 2, which suggests
that individual investors do not trade the
stock anticipating the recommendation
changes. The coefficient on the STI for for-
eigners is negative but insignificant in model
3, which means that foreign investors do not
trade the stock anticipating the event. The
coefficients on CARs over the days from -5
to -1 are significantly negative in all models,
which indicate that stock returns show short-
term reversal patterns around recommenda-
tion changes. The coefficients on the variables
representing information asymmetry are all
insignificant or marginally significant.
In untabulated tests, we divide the
sample into firms with upgrades and firms
with downgrades and run the same regres-
sions as reported in Table V. The results are
qualitatively similar to those in Table V. The
coefficients on institutions’ STIs are signifi-
cantly positive in upgrade and downgrade
samples, which means that the institutional
CAR
[0,5]
= 
0
 + 
1
STI
[-5,-1]
 + 
2
CAR
[-25,-1] 
+

3
CAR
[-5,-1]
 + 
4
Size + 
5
MB +

6
NumAnal + 
i,t
 ...........(5)
7 Refer to Pertersen (2009) about the OLS with clustered standard errors.
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investors buy/sell stocks before recommen-
dation upgrades/downgrades. However, the
coefficients on STIs by individuals and for-
eigners are insignificant.
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest
that institutional investors trade stocks an-
Table 5. The Regression on Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
Dependent Variable CAR[0,5]
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Individuals STI[-5,-1] 0.15*** 0.21***
(2.99) (3.12)
Institutions STI[-5,-1] 0.02 0.11
(0.29) (1.50)
Foreigners STI[-5,-1] -0.07 0.05
(-1.38) (0.83)
CAR[-5,-1] -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11***
(-3.81) (-2.75) (-3.07) (-2.88)
CAR[-25,-1] -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.83) (-0.84)
Firm Size 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.24) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16)
Market to Book ratio of Equity -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16
(-1.67) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-1.59)
Number of Analysts following -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.95) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-0.95)
Intercept 0.63 0.24 0.78 0.75
(0.58) (0.06) (0.70) (0.68)
Adj. R2(%) 1.73 1.32 1.50 1.94
The table reports the results of  clustered OLS on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the period of
days, 0 to 5. Model 1-3 are the result for the firms released analyst recommendation changes. Institutions,
individuals, or foreigners STI[-5,-1] mean cumulative standardized trade imbalance by each investor type
over the period of -5 to -1. CAR[-50,-26] mean CAR over pre-release days from -50 to -26. CAR[-5,-1]
mean CAR over pre-release days from -5 to -1. Firm size is a natural log of  market capitalization
measured at the end of  fiscal year. Market to book ratio of  equity is the ratio of  market value of  equity
to book value of  equity at the end of  fiscal year. Number of  analysts is the average outstanding number
of  analysts, who change at least one recommendation across the whole time period, covering each firm.
T-statistics are in parenthesis. ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level,
respectively.
ticipating the direction of recommendation
changes during days from -5 to -1 prior to the
announcements of  the changes. This evidence
corroborates the univariate results found in
Table 5.
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Conclusion
We investigate whether there exists in-
formation asymmetry among investors
around recommendation changes issued by
sell-side analysts and whether any specific
type of investors make use of the superior
information. Korean data is ideal for this re-
search since the Korea Exchange provide the
daily buying and selling volume by individu-
als, institutions, and foreigners.
We document that institutions buy/sell
the stock before recommendation upgrades/
downgrades are issued by analysts. The re-
sult is consistent with our conjecture that in-
stitutional investors are better informed than
individuals on upcoming recommendation
changes. Foreign investors do not make any
directional trades around the event, which is
consistent with the argument that they tend
not to trade using the information on upcom-
ing corporate events in emerging markets.
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